The article deals with a complex of issues connected with the campaign waged by the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336-335 BC. The author clears up the aims set for the advance-guard, its command structure, strength and composition. He also describes the relevant military operations and reveals the reasons both for the Macedonians' successes in 336 and their failures in 335. The idea is argued that despite the final failures, it is hardly possible to say that the campaign the expeditionary corps conducted ended in its total defeat. Besides, it is noted that those military operations had major significance for Alexander's campaign in Asia Minor in 334, because a number of preconditions for its full success had been created right in their course.
It cannot be said that modern scholars wrote about the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336-335 rarely. Indeed, the overviews of events connected with its military activities (as a rule, brief but sometimes slightly more detailed) can be found in most general works, recording, in more or less detail, the history of Philip and Alexander and in papers dealing with the relations between these monarchs and the Greeks of Asia Minor.3 Besides, a number of studies examine also particular aspects of the theme as well as adjacent subjects that allow to get a more complete picture of it.4 At the same time, it has to be admitted that there is no work in scholarship so far, to my knowledge, which is specially devoted to the Macedonian advance-guard in Asia Minor in 336-335 and, consequently, considers thoroughly the whole complex of issues relevant to this theme. The present essay aims to fill this gap and thereby to contribute to our knowledge of the events and circumstances of the beginning of the military conflict between Macedonia and Persia. In addition, I believe that the material discussed in the essay can be useful when turning to a number of issues connected with Alexander's campaign in Asia Minor in 334 and for better understanding of this campaign as a whole.
To begin with, let us try to answer the following question: why did Philip decide not to invade Asia Minor right away with his full army, but at first sent an advance-guard there? For that, it is necessary to clarify those aims that the king intended to achieve by this force's activities. Unfortunately, apart from Diodorus, our sources are silent in this regard. However, even Diodorus' statement that Philip ordered to his generals heading the expeditionary corps "to liberate the Greek cities" (ἐλευϑεροῦν τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις) (16.91.2; cf. Diod. 16.1.5), i. e. the Greek cities in Asia Minor which after the King's Peace (387/386) had become part of the Achaemenid Empire again, can be regarded merely as a reflection of the campaign's official objective: it is obvious that in this case we are faced with one of the Panhellenic slogans (the liberation of the Greeks of Asia from the barbarian yoke) that Philip and then Alexander used for the justification of their war against the Persian Empire. Note that another slogan of such a kind was the revenge against the Persians for their profanation of sanctuaries in Greece during the Persian wars.5 These slogans, above all the former for the Greeks of Asia Minor, had to ensure that the war against the Persian kingdom would become popular in the Greek world, including its Anatolian part, thus helping to gain, in the case of the communities of Asia Minor, the actual support of their citizens (at least partly) for the Macedonian army in general and its advance-guard in particular. As to the true aims that Philip intended to achieve by sending this advance-guard, they appear to have been primarily military in character: the expeditionary corps probably had to at least capture (and retain) a bridgehead on the Asian coast of the Hellespont in order to facilitate the crossing of the main invading army in the future, and at the most, to win (and retain) as many cities and territories in western Asia Minor as possible; also, the Macedonians needed to take firm control over the nearby islands in order not only to free the main army from the necessity to make the effort of seizing them afterwards, but also to deprive the Persian fleet of at least a considerable number, if not all, of their bases in the Aegean, a point that was very important for achieving success in the further struggle against the Persians for the whole Anatolian peninsula.6
It has to be pointed out that by the spring of 336, i. e. by the moment of sending the expeditionary corps, Philip, as it seems, had every reason to believe those troops to be able to achieve with success not only the "minimal" aim but, to a considerable degree, also the "maximal" one. Indeed, Persia had a hard time then. Apparently in the autumn of 338, the Persian king Artaxerxes III Ochus died; he was poisoned by his doctor on the order of the eunuch Bagoas, the king's favourite. Bagoas put Arses (Artaxerxes IV)on the throne, the youngest son of Artaxerxes III, and eliminated his brothers who had reached adulthood. Then, less than two years later, the eunuch killed Arses together with his children. This time -it appears in the summer of 336 -Bagoas selected Artashata/Codomannus (Darius III) as king, who belonged to a collateral line of the royal house. But several months later Darius himself ordered to poison Bagoas and thus could rule in his own right most likely by the autumn of 336 (Diod. 17.5.3-6; cf. Arr.
5 On the date and circumstances of the emergence of the concept of "the Greeks of Asia" and the appearance of the political slogan "the freedom of the Greeks of Asia", see Seager -Tuplin 1980, 141-154 . On the theme of revenge in Greek ideology and culture, see Bellen 1974, 43-67; Gehrke 1987, 121-149 . For the use of both these slogans in Philip's and Alexander's politics and propaganda during the war against Persia, see Seager 1981, 106-107; Seibert 1998, 5-58; Flower 2000, 96-135; Squillace 2004, 60-71; Rung 2016, 166-179 (each work contains references to sources and modern literature on the issue). 6 For the aims of sending the expeditionary corps into Asia Minor, cf. Ellis 1976, 219-220; Green 1991, 98, 139; Hammond 1994, 167-168; McQueen 1995, 172; Worthington 2008, 180; 2014, 111. an. 3.14.5; Just. 10.3.5).7 The weakening of the central government in view of the dynastic confusion at the Persian court, surely accompanied by the execution or removal of a number of high-ranking court officials,8 caused, as it had often happened in the Achaemenid Empire, the partial paralysis of governance and the uprising of rebellious moods and even revolts in the kingdom. In all likelihood, shortly after the murder of Artaxerxes III, Egypt (which had been reconquered by this monarch in 342) seceded from the Persian Empire once again, and a certain Chababash became its ruler.9 Likewise, it cannot be excluded that at some time in 336, prior to the official proclamation of Darius as king in Babylonia, an uprising headed by a certain Nidin-Bell broke out in this region.10 Besides, the separatist tendencies resurged also in Asia Minor: as far back as the end of 337 or a little later, in the spring of 336 (in such a case already after the Macedonian expeditionary corps' landing on the Anatolian coast), the dynast and satrap of Caria, Pixodarus,11 apparently anticipating the threat to his power from the future mil-itary actions of the Macedonians in Asia Minor, entered into secret negotiations with Philip and proposed (or responded to the respective proposition of the latter) to marry his elder daughter (probably Ada II)12 to Arrhidaeus, son of the Macedonian king; this marriage agreement had to become a prelude to the conclusion of a military alliance between the parties (ὑποδυόμενος [sc. Pixodarus] δι' οἰκεότητος εἰς τὴν Φιλίππου συμμαχίαν […] ) (Plut. Alex. 10.1).13 (Note that such an alliance was undoubtedly extremely profitable for Philip, since it, without any fight, would make Pixodarus, the ruler of almost all south-western Asia Minor14 with its numerous and well-fortified cities and harbours, including seaside Halicarnassus, his ally.)15 II 320-321, no. 640; Heckel 2006, 223; in more detail: Hornblower 1982, 45-50; Ruzicka 1992, 120-134 . 12 On her, see Berve 1926, II 12, no. 21; Heckel 2006, 4, no. 2 . 13 However, it should be pointed out that there are various interpretations of this episode given by Plutarch (including even denying its reality). The whole episode: Plut. Alex. 10.1-5. Hence there is also no unanimity as regards the chronology of events described here (among those scholars who accept the account's historicity). See e. g. Hatzopoulos 1982a, 59-66; FrenchDixon 1986a, 73-82; 1986b, 25-40; Müller 2003, 29-34; Carney 2006, 37-38; Ruzicka 2010 , 3-11 (cf. Ruzicka 1992 ; Badian 2012, 501-503; Heckel -Howe -Müller 2017, 100-103 . In my opinion, there is no sufficient grounds to consider the account of Plutarch fictitious. At the same time, regardless of who was a real initiator of the attempt to achieve this marriage agreement in order to conclude a military alliance shortly afterwards, either Pixodarus (according to the traditional view) or Philip (according to Ruzicka's view) , it is clear that the very fact of such negotiations speaks about the Carian ruler's readiness to secede from the Persians either on the eve of the Macedonian aggression in western Asia Minor or when it was already underway. 14 As well as a number of islands controlled by him (see above). 15 Besides, in Ruzicka's view, Philip could have expected that Memnon of Rhodes, being a possessor of extensive lands in western Asia Minor (see below), would stand aside in the military conflict since he was indebted to the Macedonian king: following the failure of the revolt of Artabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and Memnon's brother-in-law, the Rhodian spent about ten years in Macedonia as a refugee. See Ruzicka 1985, 87; 1992, 130 . However, I do not agree with such a view. Even if one admits that Memnon was indeed grateful to Philip, I believe that this could hardly have been a determining factor for his position at that time. After Memnon (together with Artabazus) had been pardoned by Artaxerxes III (at the request of Mentor, Memnon's elder brother) and got back into the circle of the Achaemenid military-political elite, he, judging from his further actions, was not inclined to risk once again losing everything he had reestablished with difficulty, but tried, on the contrary, to justify the trust placed in him by the Persian monarchy by all means: Memnon's loyalty to Darius III, clearly shown during the military operations against the Macedonians in 335-333, is very telling in this respect. For the general information about Memnon, see Berve 1926, II 250-253, no. 497; Hofstetter 1978, 125-127, no. 215; Heckel 2006, 162, no. 1; Badian 2006, s. v.; also see McCoy 1989, 413-433; Panovski -Sarakinski 2011 , 7-27. On Mentor, see Hofstetter 1978 Badian 2006, s. v.; Rung 2014, 143-160. Of course, Philip did not know exactly how long the Persian kingdom would be in this political crisis. However, taking into account both Persia's history and current information which he certainly received from Asia, Philip could reasonably have foreseen that after the assassination of Artaxerxes III, the crisis would not be over at least in the near future. In order to derive as much benefit from the confusion at the Achaemenid court as possible, Philip naturally had to act soon. Furthermore, the circumstances -about which the Macedonian king was obviously informed -that there was no big army in Asia Minor at the moment and that the Persian fleet's appearance in the Aegean was not expected (see below), must have forced him to do so, too. In addition, it is not ruled out that Philip could have predicted (relying on his knowledge of the Achaemenid Empire's past, including relatively recent) that even with the Persian central government becoming sufficiently steady, it -according to the Achaemenids' traditional perception of the Greek world as an important but peripheral problem for their kingdomwould not deal with the Macedonian aggression in Asia Minor immediately but at first be preoccupied with the suppression of the Egyptian revolt.16 It seems that taking all these into consideration, Philip decided not to wait until the end of his full army's preparation for the planned expedition (the preparatory activities certainly required a substantial amount of time) but sent forward only that part of it which was quite ready to conduct military operations.17 Besides, there also remained other matter that demanded Philip's personal presence in Europe.18 16 Cf. Ruzicka 1985, 86; 1992, 129 . For the traditionally peripheral importance of the Greek world in Achaemenid politics, see recently Rung 2015, 133-135 (with review of previous scholarship) . 17 It is difficult to say when Philip planned to cross into Asia Minor with his main army. In all likelihood, the expedition had to be launched either in the late autumn of 336 or the early spring of 335 (the latter variant seems to me more reasonable): at least the program of the festival in Aegae on the occasion of the marriage of Philip's daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus .2) appears to create the definite impression that the king intended to commence the expedition very soon. Cf. Ellis 1976, 221; Borza 1992, 227; Hammond 1994, 168, 219, n. 10. 18 The personal presence of Philip in Europe was needed above all to duly prepare the main invasion army. Indeed, it was unwise for the king to entrust such an important and complicated matter to his assistants. A number of family matters held him as well: firstly, the necessity to improve his relations with prince Alexander after the recent conflict with him, and secondly, to wait until the birth of a child from his new wife Cleopatra; then, already in 336, there appeared also a need for arranging a lavish festival in connection with the wedding of Cleopatra and Alexander of Epirus. Furthermore, Philip may have been involved in the campaign against the Illyrians in the late winter of 337/336. For the events of the last year of Philip's reign, see e. g. Ellis 1976, 211-219; Cawkwell 1978, 177-179; Griffith 1979, 675-684; Hammond 1994, 165-171; Worthington 2008, 172-186 . On the possible Illyrian campaign, see McQueen 1995, 177-178; and now especially: Heckel -Howe -Müller 2017, 98-100, 105. It is appropriate now to turn to the command structure of the Macedonian expeditionary corps. According to Diodorus, Philip "sent forward Attalus and Parmenio into Asia, giving them part of the army […] (9.5.8) . Taking into account the comparative weightiness of all above-named persons, it is possible to suggest that initially Parmenio, Philip's best general and a very influential man at the Macedonian court, held the position of commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force, while Attalus, his son-in-law as well as the uncle and former guardian of the king's new wife, Cleopatra, was second in command, acting as Parmenio's main assistant.19 As to Calas and Amyntas (who is mentioned by Justin), their positions in the troops operating in Asia Minor were undoubtedly more modest.20 However, some time later the command structure changed: in all likelihood, at the beginning of the campaign of 335 Attalus was eliminated on the order of Alexander (Diod. 17.2.3-6; 5.2),21 ascending the throne of Macedonia after Phil-19 There seems to be no need to pay particular attention to the fact that Diodorus names not Parmenio but Attalus first (16.92.2): it is probable that such a sequence resulted from the point that Diodorus was more interested here namely in Attalus (in connection with the prehistory of Philip's murder, given by Diodorus further). See Griffith 1979, 680, n. 3; cf. McQueen 1995, 171. For the general information about Parmenio, see Berve 1926, II 298-306, no. 606; Heckel 2006, 190-192; for Attalus, see Berve 1926, II 94, no. 182; Heckel 2006 , 62, no. 1. 20 On Calas, see Berve 1926 Heckel 2006, 74-75 . It is hard to identify this Amyntas with one or another bearer of the same name, living in the age of Philip and Alexander. Nevertheless, it appears that of all known candidates (who are relatively numerous), Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus is better suited in this case. See Berve 1926, II 29-30, no. 59; McQueen 1995, 172; Heckel 2006, 24, no. 3 . In principle, it is also possible that it was Amyntas son of Perdiccas III (thus Badian 2012, 498-499, 503) , but this idea is less convincing in my opinion. On the other hand, it looks rather strange that Amyntas is no longer mentioned in connection with the expeditionary corps. Of course, it is not ruled out that either he was soon recalled to Macedonia or simply neglected by ancient authors. However, it cannot be ruled out as well that the reference to Amyntas in Justin is a mistake or some confusion made by the epitomator (or even by Pompeius Trogus himself). 21 It is barely possible that it happened in late 336; for such a date, see e. g. Berve 1926, II 94, no. 182; Bosworth 1988, 27, 35; Hammond 1994, 168 . Also, it is highly unlikely that it was in late 335 or even in early 334, as has been suggested, in particular, by Ellis 1982, 69-72; Howe 2015, 139; cf. Heckel 2006, 62, no. 1; Heckel -Howe -Müller 2017, 116-120. Indeed, there are no grounds to date the battle of Magnesia, when Attalus was still alive (Polyaen. 5.44.4), to a later point than the ip's assassination (most probably in October of 336).22 Whether someone replaced the dead Attalus or whether Parmenio -who had explicitly shown his loyalty to the new king (it is unlikely that Attalus' execution happened without his knowledge) (cf. Diod. 17.5.2; Curt. 7.1.3; 8.7.5) -remained alone in exercising command of the whole expeditionary corps, is unknown. That Attalus was replaced by Calas,23 cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, it appears more preferable to believe that no assignment to Attalus' position occurred. Indeed, it seems obvious that Parmenio himself was able to continue to exercise command of the advance-guard, relying middle of 335 (see below). In addition, in my opinion, the following words of Justin should not be regarded as a reliable time indicator in this case: "As he was setting off for the war in Persia (Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum […] ), Alexander put to death all those of his stepmother's relatives whom Philip had promoted to high office and awarded military commands" (11.5.1, translated by J. S. Yardley; see Yardley -Heckel 1997) . Even if one leaves aside the fact that Attalus is not referred to in this passage but sees here the hint of his being murdered, there is no reason to necessarily believe that Justin (or Pompeius Trogus) placed this event in his account chronologically accurately and did not combine it with any events of such a kind, which took place a little later (the elimination of "any of his own family" [Iust. 11.5.2] by whom apparently Amyntas son of Perdiccas III is meant). On the other hand, it is absolutely uncertain why there is a need to prefer in this connection the vague account of Justin to the relatively detailed and more credible account of Diodorus (if one ignores some inaccuracies in it) that describes the behaviour of Attalus after Alexander's accession (17.2.3-6; 5.1-2). This account of Diodorus gives the clear impression that Attalus' murder happened rather soon after Alexander had become king; at least Alexander's order to Hecataeus, dispatched by him in Asia Minor, to bring back Attalus or, failing this, to kill him "as quickly as possible" (τὴν ταχίστην), barely agrees with almost a year (or even more) of waiting to carry out this order (although, of course, it is not ruled out that after Hecataeus had come to Asia Minor, he was forced to delay the completion of his mission for some time in order to find the appropriate moment). Besides, no matter how Alexander was "weak" (by the expression of T. Howe) at the very beginning of his reign, it is hard to imagine that Alexander postponed for such a long time the neutralization of the person who -regardless of our attitude towards the evidence of Attalus' intention to raise a rebellion of the advance-guard (Diod. 17.2.3-4; 5.1-2; Plut. Demosthenes 23.2) -was able to threaten Alexander's power position due to at least his kinship with Cleopatra. In addition, Attalus was the king's personal enemy, for he had publicly offended him at the symposium following Philip's and Cleopatra's wedding ceremony. (Incidentally, in my opinion, it is quite right that the attempt of Ellis 1982, 71 to doubt the historicity of this episode at the post-wedding symposium has not been supported in scholarship; see e. g. Carney 2006, 31-33; Heckel 2006, 62, no. 1; Howe 2015, 143-144; Heckel -Howe -Müller 2017, 94-100, 116-120.) 22 For the convincing arguments in favour of this date of Philip's murder, see Hatzopoulos 1982b, 21-42 (against the date suggested by Beloch 1923, III 2 60: "in die zweite Hälfte des Sommers"). A. B. Bosworth also related such an event to October; see Bosworth 1980, 45-46; 1988, 23; similarly: Borza 1999, 65; cf. Borza 1992, 227 . That the king's death occurred on 25th of September was suggested by E. Grzybek; see Grzybek 1990, 21-28; thus too: Hauben 1992 , 146. Cf. Howe 2015 . 23 So e. g. Berve 1926, II 188, no. 397. on those Macedonian officers who already were with him (especially as because Attalus' sending into Asia Minor had been apparently caused by the necessity for Philip to remove him -in view of his conflict with Alexander -from the Macedonian court rather than by military needs). On the other hand, although Diodorus and Polyaenus mention Calas only in connection with the events of 335, there are no grounds to reject the conjecture that he was in the expeditionary corps from the very beginning of the campaign and did not come into Asia Minor later in order to replace Attalus. At the same time, it is remarkable that according to Polyaenus when Memnon attempted to capture Cyzicus by stratagem, its citizens expected to see before their walls not Parmenio but Calas (5.44.5), a fact that presumably indicates that Calas was initially appointed to command a detachment of the advance-guard operating in north-western Asia Minor. It seems that the following fact speaks in favour of such an idea as well: the appointment of Calas as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in 334 (Arr. an. 1.17.1), which was probably caused by his experience in this region. The above, however, by no means diminishes Calas' high position in the structure of the Macedonian command in Asia Minor: insofar as our sources allow to judge, after the murder of Attalus he remained the most high-ranking commander subordinated to Parmenio. Therefore it is quite possible that namely Calas took over command of all troops left on the Asian coast of the Hellespont from Parmenio, when the latter in the autumn of 335 or in the winter of 335/4 was recalled by Alexander to Europe -likely to assist him in the preparation of the forthcoming expedition (Diod. 17.16.2).24
Unfortunately, the information about the size of the Macedonian expeditionary corps is limited to only one indication: Polyaenus writes that Parmenio and Attalus had 10,000 soldiers in the battle of Magnesia (5.44.4). In view of the fact that both senior generals -Parmenio and Attalus -took part in it, it is reasonable to think that in this case we have the bulk of the advance-guard. The figure itself -10,000 -(albeit certainly round) does not seem doubtful: this strength of troops was quite enough to achieve with success the aims presumably set for the advance-guard by Philip.25 At the same time, if the figure given by Polyaenus is true, then it is worth believing that the total number of soldiers of the expeditionary force was greater: some part of them must have left in other places to control the conquered territories. It would then hardly be erroneous to suggest that the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor totaled approximately 24 On the position of Calas, cf. Ruzicka 1985, 90, 94, n. 27. 25 It is interesting to note that the armies of Sparta in its campaigns in Asia Minor between 400 and 395 were nearly equal in strength, reaching about 12,000 men. For the estimation, see Ruzicka 1985, 90, 94, n. 25. 11,000 men (maybe a little more).26 As to its composition, although we have again only one evidence in the connection -according to Diodorus, a detachment under command of Calas in the Troad was a mixed force of Macedonian soldiers and Greek mercenaries (17.7.10) -this information, it seems, can be related to the advance-guard as a whole, too;27 moreover, it is probable that the Greek merce-26 On that, see the previous note as well. In the opinion of a number of scholars, it is possible to find one more evidence for the advance-guard's strength in the difference of figures given by ancient authors for Alexander's army at the very start of his expedition (a useful summary of the figures: Brunt 1963, 46) . According to the scholars, the discrepancy arises, since some authors included the expeditionary force already presenting in Asia Minor in their total and others ignored it. As to the infantry, for which the difference between the groups of maximum and minimum figures is relatively small, the resulting gap is around 10,000 (a figure being almost in agreement with that of Polyaenus for the troops under Parmenio and Attalus in the battle of Magnesia). However, as to the cavalry -a contingent of which was surely included in the expeditionary corps (see below) -the situation with the recorded figures is more complicated; therefore modern historians, who try to clear up its strength, are forced to resort to some additional conjectures which, as a result, lead them to the following conclusion: the advance-guard contained about 1,000 horsemen. See Griffith 1935, 13; Brunt 1963, 34-36; Milns 1966, 167; cf. Bosworth 1980, 98-99; 1988, 259-266 . Nevertheless, despite the attractiveness of such an approach, it should be accepted that it cannot be regarded as highly reliable, because the alternative explanation of the difference of figures given by ancient authors for Alexander's army is quite possible as well -their inaccuracy in all or at least in the majority of our literary sources (it turns out in this case that the estimation of the expeditionary corps' strength by means of the named approach is simply impracticable). Cf. Hammond 1988, 22-24 , who has argued that the true figures for the army that crossed the Hellespont with Alexander are those of Ptolemy son of Lagus, taken by Diodorus from Diyllus (the numbers of various units) and by Arrian (the totals of the king's infantry and cavalry). On the strength of the advance-guard as a whole, cf. Ruzicka 1985, 90, 94, n. 25; Hammond 1994, 168, 219, n. 9 . 27 Similarly e. g.: Parke 1933, 178, n. 6; Griffith 1935, 13; Ellis 1976, 219 . The idea of Hammond that Philip had to include in the expeditionary corps also troops of his Greek allies in order to stress the Panhellenic character of the war against Persia from the very outset, seems doubtful to me. See Hammond 1994, 168, 219, n. 9. Even if one leaves aside the fact that such troops are not evidenced in connection with the events in Asia Minor in 336-335 (in principle, this fact can be explained by the scarcity of information about them), it appears that the presence of the Greek allies in the advance-guard was then hardly necessary. Indeed, in order to represent the campaign in Asia Minor -being only a prelude to the planned expedition -as a Panhellenic war, it was quite enough for Philip at this stage to exploit, when necessary, only the respective political slogans, while adding the Greek allied troops to the main invasion army later. Likewise, Philip, it appears, had to take into account also the circumstance that the inclusion of these contingents in the expeditionary corps could negatively influence the effectiveness of the military operations waged by it: it is highly unlikely that Philip trusted his Greek allies, the majority of whom had been recently subdued by force of Macedonian arms. For the notable attitude of Alexander towards the Greek allied troops in his army, playing only a secondary role in the Asian expedition, see e. g. Berve 1926, I 142-143; Bosworth 1988, 264; Jehne 1994, 206-209; Blackwell naries were outnumbered by the Macedonian soldiers in it.28 In turn, there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the expeditionary corps were infantrymen. Nevertheless, it appears that its cavalry contingent was unlikely reduced to a minimum: it is difficult to imagine that Philip, certainly knowing the enemy cavalry to be traditionally strong and numerous,29 did not take care to provide his troops sent into Asia Minor with a sufficient number of horsemen, especially given that the king did not experience the acute lack of them at this time. Hence it is possible to assume that the advance-guard's cavalry contingent, including, in all probability, part of Greek mounted mercenaries,30 numbered at least several hundred men, presumably about 1,000.31
Besides, there are grounds to believe that the expeditionary corps was accompanied by a navy. That it was so, apart from the general consideration about the reasonableness of warships' involvement in the campaign, is plainly attested in Pomp. Trog. 9: "When Philip prepared the war against Persia and sent forward a navy with commanders (praemissa classe cum ducibus) […] ".32 Whether the 1999, 49-52; however, see Hammond 1988, 67-68; 1989, 212-214, who, in my view, unreasonably overvalued the importance of such troops in Alexander's army. 28 I do not agree with Bosworth's opinion that the number of Greek mercenaries was greater. See Bosworth 1988, 265. Unfortunately, we do not know the amount of pay of both Greek mercenaries and Macedonian soldiers (at least at this time), and therefore we cannot assess who of them was more expensive and so, in principle, less preferable financially for Philip as the expeditionary force's majority. On the pay in the Macedonian army (mainly in Alexander's age), with relevant suppositions, see especially Milns 1987, 234-251; Le Rider 2003, 103-108; cf. Knapowski 1970, 236-238; also: Holt 2016, 74-75 . Nevertheless, I believe that one should regard the following consideration as weighty when solving the issue of Macedonian and mercenary soldiers' proportion in the advance-guard: it is unlikely that Philip admitted the numerical superiority of Greek mercenaries in the expeditionary corps and thereby made the success of military operations in Asia Minor dependent on these often unreliable warriors and not on his Macedonian soldiers whom he, on the contrary, could fully rely on; of course, Greek mercenaries were needed in the advance-guard but not in number that would be able to constitute a potential threat to the campaign. 29 For the Achaemenid Persian cavalry, see now Head 1992, 31-39; with comments from Ch. Tuplin; see Tuplin 2010, 101-182. 30 Although Diodorus does not mention Greek mercenary cavalrymen among various units which crossed the Hellespont with Alexander (17.17.3-4), it is obvious that his army contained them at this time: one can find their traces in our sources in connection with later events. It is most likely that at least part of these horsemen, if not all of them, were included in the advanceguard. See Berve 1926, I 146; Griffith 1935, 16; Brunt 1963, 35; Milns 1966, 167; Bosworth 1980, 99; , 265. 31 Cf. Brunt 1963 (1,000 horsemen) ; Milns 1966, 167 (with the following specification: 400 mercenary horsemen and 600 Macedonian ones). 32 Hauben 1975, 58; Errington 1990, 104; Hammond 1994, 168, 219, n. 9; cf. Debord 1999, 424. Hammond is of the view that we have one more evidence for the warships which accompanied warships took part in the then military operations or whether they stayed in the Hellespont, protecting the line of communications, we do not know. Yet, in my opinion, their participation in these operations cannot be excluded. It is evident that the support of warships would have been quite useful when the Macedonians acted on the coast (at least for the troops' transportation and supply). In addition, there was no serious threat to the squadron of warships at this time: the appearance of the Persian fleet in the Aegean would occur only in the summer of 334 (Arr. an. 1.18.4-5). Who commanded the navy sent with the advance-guard, is unknown; however, taking into account its decidedly auxiliary character, there can be little doubt that its commander was subordinate to Parmenio. It is worth suggesting that the squadron came from Macedonia proper and totaled around 30 warships (or slightly less).33
Now let us try to reconstruct the course of military operations in Asia Minor in 336-335. It has to be admitted that the relevant information is very scarce and fragmentary. Nevertheless, the information we have allows to conclude that the the expeditionary corps. He believes that just they came in 335 by the Ister to Alexander from Byzantium (Arr. an. 1.3.3) being, according to the scholar, their base in the past winter. See Hammond 1992, 35-36. In my opinion, this view is problematic. Indeed, it seems strange that the squadron of warships of the advance-guard acting in western Asia Minor was based in Byzantium and not in a place close to the location of troops, say, in the Hellespont (which, incidentally, would have been most convenient). In addition, as Arrian writes (1.3.4), the ships were "few" (ὀλίγαι), i. e. presumably several (because they proved unable to carry a sufficient contingent of Alexander's soldiers to one of the islands, where the Thracians and Triballians had taken refuge), a body that, it appears, could hardly have corresponded with the whole navy sent with the expeditionary corps (see below). It is thus more probable that either these warships (Hammond is right that they were Macedonian and not Greek, since the participation of any Greek allied forces in Alexander's Balkan campaign is not evidenced) were only part of the advance-guard's squadron which had been ordered to move through Byzantium into the mouth of the Ister, or (more likely) this flotilla had nothing to do with the expeditionary corps at all but came from Macedonian waters on the order of Alexander; cf. Bosworth 1980, 61. 33 As in the case of the expeditionary troops (see above), it is unlikely that Philip took warships from his Greek allies for this squadron, because the strength of the Macedonian navy seems to have been enough to support the advance-guard in Asia Minor. For the contrary view being, in my opinion, unconvincing, see Hammond 1994, 168, 219, n. 9 . In turn, if Hammond is right, arguing (this time quite reasonably) that when Philip besieged Perinthus and Byzantium in 340, his navy consisted of a minimum of 30 warships (Hammond 1992, 34-35) , it appears that the Macedonian monarch provided hardly a smaller number of warships to accompany the expeditionary corps, too. At the same time, there is no doubt that part of Philip's fleet was then left in Macedonian waters: according to the estimates of Hammond, when Alexander crossed the Hellespont, he had 60 Macedonian warships. See Hammond 1988, 24-26; 1989, 209; 1992, 36-39. On the fleet at Alexander's disposal in the spring of 334, cf. Berve 1926, I 159; Hauben 1976, 80-81; Bosworth 1980, 100; 1988, 38. first year of the campaign was rather successful for the Macedonians. It is most likely that the expeditionary corps crossed the Hellespont without hindrance.34 Indeed, apart from the fact that no resistance of the Persian troops to them is known, the following consideration should be taken into account in this case: if the Persians did not prevent the landing of Alexander's army in 334, when they had the considerable forces,35 they were barely able to do this in 336, when, insofar as we are able to judge, there were no such forces in their disposal in Asia Minor (see below). Further, based on the facts that Rhoeteum was in the hands of the Macedonians in late 335 (Diod. 17.7.10) and that in the spring of 334 they held Abydus (with its rural territory), where Alexander's army landed (Arr. an. 1.11.6), it is logical to believe that these cities had fallen under the expeditionary corps' control immediately (or almost immediately) after its crossing into Asia Minor. It cannot be ruled out that the case of Ilium was the same. True, apart from the consideration that Ilium was situated in the area of the advance guard's military actions and the fact that it was a small and defenseless city at this time (Strab. 13.1.26.593), perhaps the following statement of Diodorus speaks in favour of its capture by the Macedonians in 336: when Alexander visited the sanctuary of Athena Ilias, his seer, Aristander of Telmessus, noticed a statue of Ariobarzanes, former satrap of Phrygia, laying fallen on the ground (Diod. 17.17.6).36 Besides, it can be deduced from Arrian's description of the events in Ephesus in 334 (Arr. an. 1.17.10) that two years earlier the Ephesian people overthrew their pro-Persian oligarchs and established a democracy. Whether Heropythus, a leader of the democratic faction freeing the city, was killed in some fight at the moment, or whether he died shortly afterwards, is unclear. At any rate, as we know, he was buried at the agora, possibly as a hero.37 After their success the Ephesian democrats erected 34 There seems to be no doubt that the point of the Macedonian invasion into the Persian Empire was just the Hellespont. G. Cawkwell is not right, stating that the advance-guard landed in Ephesus and thus clearly drawing the parallel with the crossing of Agesilaus' army from Aulis into Asia Minor in 396 (Xen. hell. 3.4.4; Plut. Agesilaus 7.1). See Cawkwell 1978, 170, 177; cf. Badian 1966 , 41. However, see e. g. Ellis 1976 Hammond 1994, 168; Debord 1999, 424 . Indeed, unlike the army of the Spartan king, there was no need for Philip's troops to come a long and unsafe way to the Hellespont: the distance between Macedonia and the Hellespont was relatively short and the way ran through the lands being under Macedonian control. Cf. Heisserer 1980, 66. 35 The question of why they did not prevent the Macedonian landing in 334 is controversial. See e. g. Anson 1989, 44-49 , who (giving a review of previous scholarship) argues that because the Persians did not control the entire Asian coast of the Hellespont at this time, the Persian fleet simply could not prevent the crossing of Alexander's army and therefore was not sent. On this question, also see Briant 2002 Briant , 818-820, 1043 1989, 424; Errington 1990, 279, n. 4; Hammond 1994, 168 ; for the view that it was Magnesia by Sipylum, see e. g. Badian 1966, 63, n. 20; Ruzicka 1985, 87, 93, n. 14; Cawkwell 1978, 177; Debord 1999, 421-423 . As to me, I dare not support either of these groups of scholars, considering the arguments of both of them are insufficiently convincing. 40 A history of Cyzicus in the fourth century is known to us poorly. Nevertheless, it is worth believing that the city was not already under Persian rule since the 370s (or certainly since the 360s) and thus, it seems, could well have joined Philip's side even before his campaign against the Achaemenid Empire. A brief overview of Cyzicus' history: Avram 2004, 984, no. 747. this time are reflected in an inscription of Erythrae as well (IErythrai 503).41 The inscription contains two decrees: they are the resolutions of the council and the people, ordering the statue of Philites, the tyrannicide (the name of tyrant is not mentioned), which had been damaged under the oligarchs, to be immediately repaired and consequently not only cared for but crowned by the citizens at the beginning of every month and at all festivals. Scholars, however, are not unanimous on the dating of the political changes referred to in this document: some incline to relate them (either all or only the change of government from a tyrant to the democrats who erected Philites' statue) to the 330s, including 336-335,42 others suggest the later dating, assuming that all of the events belong to the third century.43 Indeed, there is no sufficient evidence to determine precisely when the changes of political regimes, attested in the inscription, occurred in Erythrae. But, in my opinion, there are also no serious grounds to deny the connection of such changes with what happened in Asia Minor in the 330s. In other words, it is quite possible that all constitutional changes in Erythrae, referred to in the inscription, took place just in this period. Although it is difficult to establish their chronology more exactly, the following scenario, among other possible variants, is not excluded -in 336, due to the actions of the expeditionary corps in Asia Minor, a certain tyrant was slain by Philites44 and a democracy was introduced in Erythrae; then, in 335, during the successful counter-offensive of the Persians in the region, the democratic rule was superseded by the oligarchs, who in 334, after Alexander's victory in the battle of the Granicus, were replaced by the democrats again. However, whatever one believes about the case of Erythrae, one thing is clear: in 336-335 the Macedonians controlled not only the above-mentioned communities but also other Greek cities on the coast of western Asia Minor (not all 41 That the inscription is from Erythrae and not from Clazomenae, as A. Wilhelm supposed in his time (Wilhelm 1915, 30-38) , now seems to be finally proven by A. J. Heisserer. It is quite possible that he is also right, suggesting that the extant inscription is not an original document but its later copy. See Heisserer 1979, 285-293 . However, for the critique of this suggestion of Heisserer, see Teegarden 2013, 154-157 . 42 See, in particular, Badian 1966, 40, 62-63, n. 19; Ellis 1976, 222, 306 , n. 52 (these scholars note that the end of the tyrannical rule occured either in 336 or in 334); Teegarden 2013, 157-164 (he argues that this non-democratic regime being some sort of "tyranny" was overthrown in 334, while the rest of the events took place after 300). On that, cf. Syll. 3 284; Tod 191 (commentaries); also: Hammond 1994, 168, 219, n. 11; Debord 1999, 425; Panovski -Sarakinski 2011, 8; Nawotka 2010, 71; Worthington 2014, 111. 43 See e. g. Wilhelm 1915, 30-38; Berve 1967, I 422; II 719; IErythrae 503 (commentary); Hornblower 1982, 110, n. 30; Heisserer 1979, 285-293. 44 Perhaps the person killed by Philites was not a real tyrant but a prominent oligarchic leader, if we accept the idea that prior to this event Erythrae had been governed by a restricted oligarchy described as a tyranny. See Teegarden 2013, 142, n. 1, 158. of them, though), approximately from Cyzicus in the north to Ephesus (or maybe even to Magnesia-on-the Maeander) in the south45.
As to the islands of the eastern Aegean, neighbouring to this part of the Anatolian coast, it is very hard to judge about their history prior to 333, i. e. not only in 336-335 but even in 334, because of the lack of sufficient evidence. The so called "First letter" of Alexander to the Chians, composed surely in 332,46 shows that before Chios fell under Persian control in 333, it had already been enrolled in the Corinthian League (RO 84А. esp. 10-15). Furthermore, it is known that Tenedos, before its capture by the Persians in 333, had been a member of the Corinthian League as well, having an agreement with "Alexander and the Greeks" (Arr. an. 2.2.2: τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας). In turn, Mytilene in Lesbos, by the moment of its siege by the Persian troops in 333, had an agreement with "Alexander" (τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον <…> στήλας) and, according to a treaty of alliance (κατὰ συμμαχίαν), a Macedonian garrison had been placed in the city (Arr. an. 2.1.4). In addition, it can be deduced from Pseudo-Demosthenes 17.7 that 45 A number of modern historians name among these cities also Lampsacus (Badian 1966, 43; Bosworth 1980, 108; Anson 1989, 46-48; McCoy 1989, 424) , Arisbe and Percote (Anson 1989, 47) . Although they indeed could have fallen under Macedonian control in 336, it is, however, impossible to state this definitely (especially in case of Lampsacus): Lampsacus' capture by Memnon, recorded in the "Economics" by Ps.-Aristotle (2.29a-b.1351b), can well be related not to 335, when Memnon waged the counter-offensive against the Macedonians (see below), but to an earlier time (Dedord 1999, 426; Kholod 2018; however, cf. van Groningen 1933, 175) , while the fact that in 334 Alexander's army encamped in Arisbe and then passed through Percote (Arr. an. 1.12.6) means nothing (these small cities, like the others on the Macedonian army's way, were, of course, unable to resist and thus simply surrendered to Alexander). In turn, it is worth noting that P. Briant's idea that Iasus may have been taken by the expeditionary corps in 336, too, is completely groundless; see Briant 2002, 817 . 46 On the dating, see especially Kholod 2012, 26 , where the opinion that this inscription can be dated to 334 is criticized. Yet, such an opinion has been recently repeated once more; see Wallace 2016, 246. In the connection it is enough to provide only one argument in favour of its dating to 332. From the "First letter" we know about Alexander's decision to install his garrison in Chios (RO 84А. 17-19). However, according to Arrian, the city surrendered to Memnon in 333 without resistance (Arr. an. 2.1.1; 3.2.5). It is difficult to imagine that such a result would have been possible, if Alexander's garrison presented in Chios at the moment (the case of Mytilene is quite significant in the case: Arr. an. 2.1.1-5; cf. Diod. 17.29.2). At the same time, it is highly unlikely that the Macedonian king, contrary to his decision, did not install the garrison in Chios, or he withdrew it very soon: the Persian threat still existing in the region in 334 had certainly to prevent him from doing so. On the other hand, there is nothing that can doubt the establishment of Alexander's garrison in Chios in 332, when the Macedonian commanders, Hegelochus and Amphoterus, freed it from Persian control (Arr. an. 3.2.3-5; Curt. 4.5.14-21). Moreover, the point that the garrison was established then in Chios, is explicitly confirmed by Curtius (4.8.12). On Alexander's garrisons in the Greek cities in Asia Minor and the nearby islands, see in detail: Kholod 2010c, 249-258. among the members of the Corinthian League were Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos, from which Alexander expelled the tyrants who already were in power when their cities joined the League (πρὸ τῶν ὁμολογιῶν). At the same time, the presence of altars to Zeus Philippius in Eresus, the destruction of which the Eresian people ascribed to the tyrant Agonippus in 332 (Ellis-Evans.47 A3.4-5: τοὶς βώμοις ἀ[νέσ] καψε τῶ Δίος τῶ [Φ]ιλιππί[ω]), points to some Macedonian impact on the affairs of Eresus (marked so highly) in Philip's lifetime.
Despite such poor evidence (admitting, as a result, of various interpretations of the information it contains)48, it is however worth believing that in 336 all of the main islands along part of the Anatolian coast seized by the expeditionary corps, i. e. Tenedos, Lesbos, and Chios, found themselves under control of the Macedonian monarchy. Indeed, it is obvious that the exercise of control over the islands of the eastern Aegean was, as has been said, very important for the Macedonians, since it, together with the capture of the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor, had to deprive the Persian fleet of any bases in the area (or at least to reduce their number). In view of this, it seems strange if in 336, at the time of the advance-guard's offensive in western Asia Minor, Parmenio who had the 47 Ellis-Evans 2012, 206-207. 48 Some scholars think that these island communities joined the Macedonian side in 336, suggesting the direct involvement of the expeditionary force in the change of their foreign policy orientation. See e. g. Badian 1966, 40, 43; Ellis 1976, 221, 306, n. 49; Heisserer 1980, 58-78, 83-95, 131-141; Errington 1990, 104; Green, 1991 98; Hammond 1994, 168-169, 219-220, n. 16-17; Briant 2002, 817; Worthington 2008, 180; 2014, 111; cf. Tod 191-192, 201; RO 83-85 (commentaries) . Others are of the view that the Macedonians managed to gain control over these communities only later, in 334, when the army and fleet of Alexander, the victor in the battle of the Granicus, advanced along the western coast of Asia Minor. See, in particular, Berve 1926, I 245-246; Kaerst 1927, 342-343; Ehrenberg 1938, 17, 19-30. (Note that scholars of both groups do also not deny the possibility that some of these cities sided with the Macedonian monarchy earlier, becoming members of the Corinthian League either at the very moment of its creation or shortly afterwards; cf. Nawotka 2010, 72.) Furthermore, as a rule it is accepted that the establishment of Macedonian control over the cities in the islands of the eastern Aegean was accompanied by the introduction of democratic regimes in them. A somewhat different opinion on the issue has been expressed by Bosworth. According to him (he is based in this case on the extant evidence for Chios and Eresus), these island cities had associated themselves with Philip before his advance-guard landed in Asia Minor and possibly even had been foundation members of the Corinthian League. However, as the scholar believes, there were no changes in government in the communities at this time: their restricted oligarchies continued to be in power, now supported by Philip and thenuntil they were forced to come over to the Persian side in 333 -by Alexander. See Bosworth 1980, 178-179, 183-184; 1988, 192; cf. Rosen 1982, 355-356 . Of recent works on the issue, see Wallace 2016, 239-258, who argues that not only Eresus but also Tenedos, Mytilene, Chios, and Cos entered into the Corinthian League since its creation under their pro-Macedonian tyrannies and were loyal to the Macedonian monarchy until Alexander replaced them with democracies in 334.
warships at his disposal (see above), did not take an opportunity to establish or strengthen Macedonian control over the cities of the nearby islands, transporting some troops to them if necessary. Besides, there is no doubt that the foreign policy orientation of these communities could have changed also under the indirect influence of events on the nearby Anatolian coast; if for this there was a need of some impact from the outside, it should definitely have been small. Presumably such was the situation with Chios, if not with a number of other island cities as well.49 On the other hand, it is quite possible that some island communities joined Philip's side even before the landing of the advance-guard on the coast of Asia Minor. Perhaps Tenedos and Mytilene, which had in all probability remained members of the Second Athenian Confederacy up to its dissolution, were enrolled in the Corinthian League simultaneously with their former patron, Athens, i. e. in 338/7.50 In turn, it is highly likely that the tyrants of Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos entered into the Corinthian League at the same moment, too. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the tyrannical regime in Eresus erected the altars to Zeus Philippius just on the occasion of the city's enrollment in the League, if not in gratitude for some assistance provided by Philip to its representatives at about this time (and in any case with hope for his future support).51 49 I believe that it was not, however, the case for Cos. Since Cos, like maybe Chios, was earlier under control of Pixodarus, who nearly became Philip's ally in 337/6 (see above), its enrollement in the Corinthian League in 338/7 seems hardly possible. In addition, Cos, in contrast to Chios, was relatively far away from the military operations the Macedonian expeditionary corps waged in 336-335. Nevertheless, see Wallace 2016, 255. 50 For Tenedos in the connection, see Bosworth 1980, 183-184 . On the problem of Mytilene's enrollment in the Corinthian League, see Kholod 2010а, 36-37 (with relevant literature) . 51 For the idea that the erection of altars to Zeus Philippius should not be regarded as a piece of evidence of the introduction of Philip's cult in Eresus, see above. The chronology of events and the number of tyrannies in Eresus in the 330s, evidenced in the so called Tyrants Dossier from the city and chapter 7 of speech 17 in the Demosthenic corpus, are controversial in scholarship. In the view of Heisserer, which became the communis opinio, there were three pro-Persian tyrannies in the city (the "first" group of tyrants, Apollodorus, Hermon, and Heraeus, who ruled prior to 336 and in 335; the "second" one, Agonippus and Eurysilaus, who were in power in 333), each replaced by a pro-Macedonian democracy (in 336, 334, and 332). See Heisserer 1980 , 58-78. Similarly: Labarre 1996 RO 83 (commentary) ; Ellis-Evans 2012, 183; Teegarden 2013, 124. In turn, Bosworth has argued for two tyrannies in Eresus (the "first" group of tyrants, prior to ca. 340; the "second" one, from ca. 340 to 333). In his opinion, Agonippus and Eurysilaus entered into the Corinthian League in 337 and were pro-Macedonian until 333 when they defected to the Persians. See Bosworth 1980, 178-179; 1988, 192 ; and see above. I follow the theory of J. B. Lott whose arguments seem to me most convincing. He believes that the "first" tyrants in Eresus became allies of Philip in ca. 338 (the city joined the Corinthian League and they erected altars to Zeus Philippius) and remained loyal to the Macedonian monarchy up to 334 when Alexander replaced them with a democracy. The "second" tyrants seized power with the support of the Per-It is thus clear that the military successes of the expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336 were big, albeit not brilliant (in comparison with those of Alexander during his campaign in Asia Minor in 334). It seems that such a result was achieved for two main reasons. First, at this time, as far as we are able to judge, the Persians had no sufficient force in Asia Minor which could resist the Macedonians, and moreover steps for its creation were not taken then. While Bagoas was alive, he presumably was afraid to entrust the task of recruiting substantial troops to the satraps of western Asia Minor (above all to Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, in the territories of whom the Macedonian contingents were operating).52It is possible that he was taking into account that these troops can be sooner or later used -which had happened in the Persian history several times -against the central government being, furthermore, weak at that moment. As to the satraps themselves, in all likelihood, they did not dare to act in such a matter independently, because they in their turn were afraid that any of their attempts to levy troops extensively would be regarded at the Persian court -especially by Bagoas -as a preparation for uprising and hence this would threaten them with disfavours and even reprisals.53 Second, the successes of the expeditionary corps in the campaign of 336 were also most probably caused by the circumstance that the Greek cities of Asia Minor, located in the area of the advance-guard's actions, surrendered to it without resistance and even (at least some of them, like Ephesus) decisively supported the Macedonians: our sources, including Diodorus, do not refer to military operations in 336 (in contrast to ones in 335), a fact that apparently speaks about a mainly peaceful course of events, thus not drawing the attention of the literature tradition. It appears that such a position of the Greek cities of Asia Minor was determined, on the one hand, by their citizens' fear of resistance to a superior armed force (which was the expeditionary corps at this time), who also had to understand that they could expect no military assistance from the Persians yet. And on the other hand, it resulted, I think from the support that the Macedonian monarchy's campaign received from the population of these cities. Indeed, it is evident that the Panhellenic slogans used by Philip in the war against Persia could not but get a corresponding sians in 333 and were overthrown by the Macedonians in 332. See Lott 1996, 26-40; also see Wallace 2016, 239-258, who has developed Lott's argumentation; cf. Lehmann 2015 , 36-46. Cf. Dmitriev 2004 , who remaining neutral as regards the above-indicated opinions, suggests -I think, unconvincingly -that the trial of Agonippus and Eurysilaus, known from the Tyrants Dossier, happened not in 332 but in 324, after the publication of Alexander's Exiles Decree. 52 On Arsites, see Berve 1926, II 82, no. 151; Ruzicka 1985, 88; Heckel 2006, 54-55 ; on Spithridates, see Berve 1926, II 358, no. 715; Ruzicka 1985, 87-88; Heckel 2006, 254-255 . 53 Cf. Ruzicka 1985, 84-86, 88-90. response from the Greeks of Asia Minor (in all probability, their majority) being from 387/386 under the supreme authority of the barbarian Persians, which they considered to be shameful: according to the notions prevailing in the Greek world at that time, the Persians were the eternal enemies of the Greeks and, in their eyes, humans of a lower order.54 Besides, it is worth believing that the following point also contributed to the appearance of this support: most likely Philip (not Alexander in 334) began to encourage in these cities democratic factions that were in opposition to pro-Persian oligarchs or tyrants, who controlled -with assistance from their Persian patrons -the communities from within.55 True, although the only undoubted piece of evidence of the support of democracy by Philip in the Greek cities of Asia Minor is one for Ephesus,56 it is hard to imagine that democratic governments in these cities were not established any more at this time: it seems obvious that in view of the pro-Persian orientation of oligarchs and tyrants, most of whom were barely ready to cooperate with the Macedonian monarchy, changing sides easily, Philip had no need to prevent the coming of democratic factions -being hostile to oligarchic and tyrannical regimes -to power in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. On the contrary, there should have emerged a need for him to provide assistance in this matter to democrats (interested very much in the king's protection), in order to win their and their adherents' support and thus have his own partisans in the Greek communities of the peninsular. In other words, it is worth believing that the encouragement of a democracy in the Greek cities of Asia Minor by Philip (and then by Alexander) was caused by the military-political reasons and in general bore fruits. However, it does not follow from this that Philip replaced oligarchic and tyrannical governments with democracies in these cities (on the coast and the nearby islands) everywhere: our evidence 54 Greek perceptions of the Persians (and the barbarians in general), including the extremely hostile and disdainful attitude towards them, has received much attention in scholarship. Here I shall limit myself to mentioning only several studies (where one can find references to the relevant sources and further literature) : Hall 1989; Isaac 2004; Marinovich 2006, 5-29; Mitchell 2007; cf. Vlassopoulos 2013, 60-77 . 55 On the internal political situation in the Greek cities in Asia Minor before the beginning of the Macedonian monarchy's war against the Persian kingdom, see relatively recently Kholod 2010b, 265-267. As to the communities in the nearby islands, note that although they did not formally belong to the Achaemenid Empire, the internal political situation at least in a number of them on the eve of the war was similar to one in the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor: from the middle of the 350s the power in these island cities passed into hands of oligarchs or tyrants most of whom adhering to Persia (either directly or indirectly, i. e. through Mausolus and his successors) now allowed it to exercise de facto control over their communities. See Ehrenberg 1938, 17-23; Kholod 2008, 80-81 (with further literature) . 56 That the democratic regime in Erythrae was established just at this time (see above), is, unfortunately, only a conjecture. explicitly shows that the Macedonian king was always ready to support any political faction in Greek cities, if only it was willing to serve his interests.57
In the meantime, in 335, or more exactly already from the end of the preceding year, the situation changed. After Philip's murder most likely in October of 336 (see above) his son and successor Alexander was forced to restore the Macedonian monarchy's weakened positions in Greece and the Balkans, and was thus unable to pay proper attention to the affairs in Asia Minor. On the contrary, the new king of Persia Darius III, who firmly established himself on the throne in all probability by the autumn of 336,58 managed to take measures to recapture the lost territories of the Achaemenid Empire, including those in Asia Minor.
As Diodorus writes, Darius dispatched in Asia Minor a force of 5,000 Greek mercenaries, putting them under command of Memnon (17.7.3). Exactly when this event took place is difficult to say. Of course, it is impossible to completely rule out that the unit's sending and its arrival in Asia Minor took place still in the autumn of 336. However, in my opinion, it is more reasonable to suggest that this contingent was sent to the Anatolian front only in the late winter and appeared there at the very beginning of the spring of 335. Indeed, if the sequence of events in Diodorus' account (17.7.1-2) is right (at least there seems to be no weighty reason to think otherwise), it turns out that the unit's dispatching in Asia Minor had to occur already after Alexander's confirmation as the new hegemon of the Corinthian League, i. e. in the late autumn of 336 at the earliest (if one takes into consideration the date of Philip's death; see above). Further, there appear to be sufficient grounds to believe that approximately from the end of 336 to February of 335 Darius' army and presumably fleet59 were engaged in the suppression of Chababash's revolt in Egypt (which, as a result, was reconquered).60 Moreover, 57 See Kholod 2010b, 267-270. 58 As has been said, the chronology of events at the Persian court in 338-336, including the exact date of the beginning of Darius III's reign, is controversial. At the same time, the opinion that his accession should be dated to about the summer of 336 seems to me most convincing. See Beloch 1923, III 2 130; Olmstead 1948, 490; Bosworth 1980, 347; Dandamaev 1985, 254-255; Hammond 1994, 167, 219, n. 5; Kholod 2011, 156; cf. Berve 1926, II 117, no. 244; Briant 2002 Briant , 1033 Heckel 2006, 103; Kuhrt 2013, 10, no. 3, 424-425 and 425, n. 9 . 59 Anson 1989, 45; Ruzicka 2012, 204 . 60 Though it is quite possible that the spread and final reestablishment of Persian power in Egypt took some more time. See Anson 1989, 45, 48; cf. Ruzicka 2012, 204 . For the date of Darius' campaign against Chababash, see particularly Kienitz 1953, 109-110, 187-188 (compare it with those views on the issue that have been expressed in the works mentioned above). On the point of why the Persians managed to reconquer Egypt quickly this time, see Ruzicka 2012, 204-205. Besides, note that if in Babylonia in 336, before Darius was officially claimed as its king, an uprising of Nidin-Bel indeed happened (see above), the new Persian king is unlikely to have delayed insofar as we are able to judge, the fulfillment of the Egyptian campaign was considered by the Persian king (at least by its beginning) a primary task. Such an attitude of Darius towards this campaign was probably caused by the following circumstances: on the one hand, by his desire to reestablish the Persian power over Egypt quickly and firmly in order not to allow this country to enroot its independence once again and hence to avoid wasting in the future so much efforts for its reconquest as had been made by his crowned predecessors, first of all by Artaxerxes III, earlier in the fourth century:61 on the other hand, by his then underestimation -traditional for the Achaemenids (see above) -of the danger coming from the Greek world. In addition, it is quite possible that after Philip's assassination and the accession of young Alexander, the Persian monarch was sure that the threat of large-scale war with Macedonia disappeared or at least was highly reduced and therefore it was unnecessary to pay particular attention to the affairs in western Asia Minor (however, when it became plain that this threat was still present, the Egyptian campaign was most likely already underway) (cf. Diod. 17.7.1-2). Thus in view of how much importance Darius attached to the expedition in Egypt, it seems probable that the Greek mercenaries dispatched by him in Asia Minor earlier were part of the army which suppressed Chababash's revolt. Indeed, it is very unlikely that Darius would have weakened the troops assembled or already fighting in Egypt by detaching from them a rather numerous contingent of Greek soldiers of fortune. If so, it appears that its sending into Asia Minor should be related to a moment shortly after the reconquest of Egypt (or at least after Persia's decisive successes on the Egyptian front).62
In turn, it seems that approximately at the same time Darius had at last to send orders to the Anatolian satraps (above all to Arsites and Spithridates) to begin to mobilize troops, so that they could resist the expeditionary corps.63 However, since the implementation of such an order required some amount of time (perhaps a considerable one),64 namely Memnon was initially forced to conduct military operations. It is worth believing that because of this circumstance -and not because it was Memnon alone who commanded the Persian forces in western its suppression; in other words, this uprising had to be suppressed by the Persians very soon, at least prior to the Egyptian campaign. Cf. Bosworth 1988, 34 . 61 For the efforts of the Achaemenids to restore their power over Egypt in the fourth century, see now in detail: Ruzicka 2012, 66-198. 62 Cf. Ruzicka 1985, 91; Anson 1989, 48. 63 Perhaps this step of the Persian king is reflected in Diodorus' words that in order to fight against Alexander, Darius, apart from fitting out a large number of ships, "assembled numerous strong troops and selected his best commanders […]" (πολλὰς δυνάμεις ἀξιολόγους συνιστάμενος, ἡγεμόνας τε τοὺς ἀρίστους προκρίνων […]) (17.7.2). 64 But see Briant 2002, 819. Asia Minor in 335, as it may seem at first sight from the accounts of Diodorus and Polyaenus -mainly his military activities are described by these authors. In addition, judging from their records, namely Memnon managed to achieve a series of successes in his fight against the Macedonians, having turned the tide in Asia Minor in favour of the Persians. It appears that Darius' choice for none other than Memnon as head of the contingent of Greek mercenaries dispatched by him in Asia Minor was based on the following reasons: first, the great military experience of the Rhodian who, in addition, had a high reputation among Greek soldiers of fortune;65 second, the Persian king's assurance of Memnon's devotion to him;66 third, the fact that Memnon possessed extensive lands (chora) in north-western Asia Minor,67 that were hence situated in the area of the Macedonian aggression but that he could not defend on his own in contrast to the satraps, since he had not both sufficient resources and formal competence.68 Besides, Diodorus' words that Darius himself appointed Memnon as commander of 5,000 Greek mercenaries and then ordered him to march to Cyzicus (17.7.2-3), give a rather clear impression that the Rhodian was not subordinate to any of the satraps of Asia Minor (at least at this time) but was responsible directly to the Persian king. Thus, in my opinion, there was no commander-in-chief of the Persian forces in Asia Minor in 65 In addition, it is not ruled out that at least most, if not all, of Greek mercenaries from this contingent had already served under Mentor's command in Asia Minor in the late 340s (during the "war against the rebels", including Hermias of Atarneus), and therefore now it was logical to put them under command of his younger brother, Memnon, being surely familiar to the mercenaries. On the war waged by Mentor against Hermias and "the rebels", now see Ruzicka 1985, 84-86; 1992, 120-123; Debord 1999, 417-420 ; on Hermias, also see Berve 1967, I 332-335, II 688-689; Hofstetter 1978, 79-81, no. 143; Trampedach 1994, 66-79. 66 It is obvious that Darius would have never placed 5,000 Greek mercenaries under command of a person in whose devotion he had some serious doubts, especially in such a very complicated situation in western Asia Minor at this moment. On that, also see above. 67 Polyaen. 4.3.15; Arr. an. 1.17.8. For Memnon's chora in Asia Minor, now see in detail: Kholod 2018. 68 On the regional level, the creation of a force was the prerogative of a satrap. For the military functions of Persian satraps, see Dandamaev -Lukonin 1980, 112-114 ; and now particularly: Klinkott 2005, 281-305 . Nevertheless, this is not to say that Memnon as a major landowner of north-western Asia Minor should not, when necessary, draw warriors from his own estates to include them in a force of satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia or Lydia. Indeed, according to Diodorus, at the Granicus Memnon fought together with "his own horsemen" (τοὺς ἰδίους ἱππεῖς) on the left wing of the Persian army (17.19.4), and therefore it is possible to think that at least a certain portion of them were levied by him within his chora. On that, see Kholod 2018 . The number of those horsemen is unknown, but, in all probability, it was relatively small. Cf. McCoy 1989, 420. In view of the fact that this cavalry unit is not mentioned in Diodorus' and Polyaenus' accounts of the campaign of 335, one can conclude that at this time it was not part of Memnon's contingent yet and came under his "flag" slightly later, maybe either in late 335 or in early 334. 336-335: Memnon and each of the satraps of western Anatolia were subordinate directly to Darius and commanded their own troops, possibly holding war-councils whenever necessary, as this happened in Zeleia on the eve of the battle of the Granicus (Diod. 17.18.2-4; Arr. an. 1.12.9-10).69 Lastly, there are grounds to suggest that simultaneously with the military measures undertaken by the Persian king against the Macedonian expansion in Asia Minor (if not a little earlier), he began to use political propaganda among the Greeks (especially the Balkan Greeks). There is no doubt that the objective of this propaganda was to call the Greek cities to a revolt and thereby to involve them on the Persians' side in the war against Alexander. Such an event would have certainly made Darius' struggle against the Macedonians much easier, perhaps jeopardizing the very continuation of their Asian campaign.70
Insofar as our sources allow to judge, Memnon began to conduct his counter-offensive against the Macedonian expeditionary corps right after the arrival of 5,000 Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor. It should be suggested that the first serious defeat -occurring most likely in the early spring of 33571 -he inflicted on 69 Cf. Panovski -Sarakinski 2011, 9. I do not agree with P. Briant who believes that namely Arsites bore primary responsibility for conducting military operations against the Macedonians in Asia Minor before and on the eve of the battle of the Granicus (as well as for the battle itself). See Briant 2002 Briant , 818, 821-823, 1043 . Indeed, the idea of Arsites' officially leading position among the Persian satraps and commanders in Asia Minor finds no confirmation in our sources not only for 336-335 but, it appears, for 334 too. That at the war-council in Zeleia Arsites' voice sounded especially loud (Arr. an. 1.12.10), can well be explained by reasons other than his somewhat special position at this time: first, while of all Persian noblemen assembled in Zeleia he was, insofar as we are able to judge, most experienced in struggling with the Macedonians (in 340, when, on the order of Artaxerxes III, he played a key role in providing support to Perinthus besieged by Philip II [Paus. 1.29.10], and, in all likelihood, in 335), his place in the hierarchy of the Achaemenid Empire was higher than Memnon's (whose experience of such a kind was at least not less); second, the war-council was held in Arsites' satrapy and the expected battle with Alexander -the decision of which most likely already had been taken by Darius (on that point, I agree with Briant) -should also happen in Hellespontine Phrygia. As to his suicide after the battle of the Granicus, it may have had the following reason: Arsites' conviction that the opinion which he had very actively defended at the war-council and which had thus been supported by the Persian noblemen, caused a disaster. Taking the above into account, it seems better to speak about the principle of collegial command of the Persian troops in Asia Minor before and on the eve of the battle of the Granicus (as well as in the battle itself). Similarly: Devis 1964, 34-44; Bosworth 1988, 39; McCoy 1989, 433, n. 65 ; but see Badian 1977 , 283-284 (he, however, changed his view later: Badian 2000 ; Panovski -Sarakinski 2011, 14. 70 For Persian political propaganda in the war against Alexander, see in detail: Kholod 2011, 149-160 . 71 Although, according to Diodorus (17.7.2; 7.8), Memnon's first military undertaking was his march to Cyzicus, the battle of Magnesia, evidenced by Polyaenus (5.44.4), in all probability pre-Parmenio and Attalus, despite their troops' numerical superiority (10,000 against 4,000),72 in the battle of Magnesia -either Magnesia-on-the Meander or Magnesia by Sipylus (see above); as a result, the Macedonians were forced to retreat into the city (Polyaen. 5.44.4). In all likelihood, then Memnon (according to Diodorus, on the order of the Persian king) traversing Mt. Ida73 unexpectedly appeared before the walls of Cyzicus, a Macedonian ally. Perhaps the objective of this operation was to compel the bulk of the expeditionary corps to withdraw to the north in view of the danger to be cut off from the Hellespont; in addition, the Persians undoubtedly intended to reestablish thus their control over this rich and strategically important city.74 However, Memnon could not capture Cyzicus by sudden attack, as he had planned, and after plundering its rural territory retreated (Diod. 17.7.3; 7.8; Polyaen. 5.44.5). He next set out to Aeolis, where Parmenio was operating. By this moment the Macedonian general had captured Gryneium, offering dated this episode, since Attalus took part in it (on his death, see above). Cf. Panovski -Sarakinski 2011, 8. As has been said, in principle, it is possible that the arrival in Asia Minor of the unit of Greek mercenaries, who were put under Memnon's command by Darius, happened in the autumn of 336 and, consequently, the battle of Magnesia could have occurred at the end of this year. Thus, see, in particular, Bosworth 1988, 35; Hammond 1994, 168; Nawotka 2010, 72 . Yet, in my opinion, it is more reasonable to think that Memnon's Greek mercenaries arrived on the Anatolian front not earlier than the very beginning of 335 (see above), and therefore the battle of Magnesia can be dated to a point shortly after this event (taking into consideration that Attalus was still alive then). 72 Some scholars state that these figures should be taken with caution, believing the victory of Memnon's unit over the troops of Parmenio and Attalus (which outnumbered it more than two to one) to be problematic. See e. g. Panovski -Sarakinski 2011, 8, n. 5 (with further literature). Nevertheless, in my view there are no serious grounds for such a doubt: it is enough to remember how many times in the military history of the past, including antiquity, something like this happened; in addition, according to Polyaenus, although the Macedonians suffered defeat in the battle of Magnesia, they were not completely destroyed and retreated into the city. 73 Perhaps this undertaking can be dated relatively exactly, if one admits that Diodorus' sudden digression from his account of the march of Memnon to Cyzicus, dealing with a strange atmospheric phenomenon observed at Mt. Ida about the time of the heliacal rising of Sirius, is not accidental but is connected with crossing this range by the Rhodian's mercenaries: taking into account the time of the heliacal rising of Sirius (for the ancient period), this crossing had to occur in the second half of July of 335. In such a case it cannot be ruled out that Diodorus' digression was provoked by his source's reference to such an atmospheric phenomenon with which the soldiers of Memnon were then faced. Cf. Welles 1963, 136-137, n. 1; Badian 1966, 39;  for Sirius in Greek and Roman literature, see e. g. Theodossiou -Manimanis -Dmitrijević -Mantarakis 2011, 180-189. Yet, it should be recognized that the above-given idea is not more than a supposition: the digression made by Diodorus in this place could well be caused by other reasons (for example, by the opportunity to narrate what he knew about Mt. Ida and, among other things, about the atmospheric phenomenon observed there). 74 Cf. Debord 1999, 423. resistance to him, and sold its citizens into slavery.75 Aeolian Pitane also decided to resist Parmenio who besieged it. But Memnon forced him to raise the siege and thereby probably saved the population of Pitane from sharing the fate of the inhabitants of Gryneium (Diod. 17.7.9) .
Why both these Greek communities showed hostility to the Macedonians is unknown. However, it is worth supposing that the pro-Persian regimes existing there were rather stable, since their representatives presumably managed to pursue a wise and, at the same time, flexible policy towards the majority of their fellow-citizens, avoiding acute conflicts with them.76 In addition, now the stability of these regimes had to be strengthened by the appearance of the Persian troops in western Asia Minor that were able to resist the expeditionary corps being earlier the only large armed force in the region. Besides, such a position of Gryneium and Pitane seems to have been highly influenced by the information reaching their inhabitants that the confusion at the Persian court had already ended and the new Great king was undertaking vigorous measures to restore the territorial integrity of the Persian Empire, not setting aside western Anatolia too. As to the information that was coming from Europe, it, on the contrary, may have created the impression among the population of Gryneium and Pitane that young Alexander was unable to continue the war against Persia actively, at least in the near future. If all this was so, it is clear that under the circumstances the inhabitants of both cities had to find it more favourable for themselves to take the Persian side decisively, getting involved in the fight against the Macedonians. Likewise, it cannot be ruled out that by this moment such an inclination became dominant also in a number of other Greek communities of Asia Minor, still uncontrolled by the advance-guard, where democrats were too weak to seize power on their own. Moreover, it is quite possible that some disbelief in the success of the campaign of the Macedonian monarchy began then to spread also among the population of those Greek cities of Asia Minor that had earlier supported it.
It seems that such a change of moods of the Greeks of Asia Minor was the main reason of so severe a reaction of Parmenio to the resistance of Gryneium: in all probability, it should have been an awesome message to the Greek commu-75 Despite this fact, Gryneium, however, was resettled soon afterwards. For the relevant evidence, see Rubinstein 2004 Rubinstein , 1042 Rubinstein , no. 1042 At the beginning of the fourth century, Gryneium was controlled by the descendents of Gongylus of Eretria, whom Xerxes had given this city after his arrival in Persia (together with Gambrium, Palaegamgrium and Myrina) as a gift for supporting the Persian interests (Xen. hell. 3.1.6; cf. Xen. an. 7.8.8) . It is not excluded that Gryneium was still under the Gongylides' rule in 335. On this gift, see, in particular, Dandamaev -Lukonin 1980, 149; Briant 1985, 62-63; 2002, 561-562, 969; Debord 1999, 189-191. nities of Asia Minor, both those that did not wish to submit to the Macedonians peacefully and those -already controlled by the latter -whose population (at least partly) began to doubt Macedonian arms' success in the war against Persia. At the same time, in my view, one should connect directly the episode of selling Gryneium's inhabitants as slaves neither with Philip's policy nor with Alexander's towards the Greek cities of Asia Minor.77 It appears that namely Parmenio was responsible for the cruelty shown in this case, which sharply contrasted with the Panhellenic slogan "the liberation of the Greeks of Asia", proclaimed by Philip and then taken up by Alexander. Indeed, in my opinion, Badian is right, pointing out78 that it is unlikely that Alexander -who was fully occupied with the Macedonian, Greek and Balkan matters after the death of his father, "dealing with rivals, enemies and rebels" -made any changes to the instructions on how to construct relations with the Greek cities of Asia Minor, issued by Philip to Parmenio (although there is no doubt that such instructions were -atleast tacitlyapproved by Alexander).79 Nevertheless, this is not to say that Parmenio had to adhere to these orders of Philip consistently, especially in 335, when the military situation in western Asia Minor became much more complicated. It is clear that under the circumstances, Parmenio's main task was not to follow strictly the lofty words of Panhellenic propaganda but at least to retain the territories that had been brought under Macedonian control earlier, if not to expand them. In order to achieve such a task, he, of course, was ready to use even brute violence; in this case the end justified the means.80
Unfortunately, we do not know what exactly happened further. It is possible that after his failure to capture Pitane Parmenio turned back north to the Hellespont and, taking into account its particular strategic importance, entrenched there. At least the last battle of the campaign of 335, attested in our sources (Diod. 17.7.10), occurred just in the Troad; in this battle the soldiers of the Macedonian Calas were defeated and retreated into Rhoeteum. It is remarkable that Diodorus mentions as Calas' enemy not Memnon but "the Persians" (τοὺς Πέρσας) who, according to the ancient historian, "were much more numerous" (ὄντας πολλαπλασίους) than the Macedonian warriors. It is likely that in the Troad Calas confronted either the united forces of the western Anatolian satraps or the contingents of one of them -Arsites (it is most probably, if so) or Spithridates -who must have succeeded considerably in recruiting troops by this moment.81 Whether or not the Macedonians left Rhoeteum afterwards, is unclear. At the same time, it is known that they managed to retain Abydus (with its rural territory) on the Asian cost of the Hellespont, where Alexander's army landed in the spring of 334 (Arr. an. 1.11.6). As to the other Greek cities in Asia Minor, controlled by the Macedonians earlier, after they had been deprived of external support with the advance-guard's withdrawal, they came back -apparently without resistance82 -under the Great king's authority, and pro-Persian oligarchic or tyrannical regimes were restored in them. Sometimes these regimes relied on the Persian garrisons introduced in these cities (or located somewhere nearby).83 Arrian reveals that Ephesus surrendered to Memnon who placed a garrison in the city and helped in establishing the oligarchic regime of Syrphax and his family there. The Ephesian oligarchs immediately punished their opponents, the pro-Macedonian democrats, by banishing them from the city (and perhaps even executing a number of them),84 plundered the temple of Artemis, threw down Philip's statue in it and, in 81 Cf. Bosworth 1988, 35; Panovski -Sarakinski 2011, 8-9 ; but see Nawotka 2010, 73. There is no doubt that later these troops were part of the Persian army fighting against the Macedonians in the battle of the Granicus. 82 It is worth believing that otherwise our literary sources would have indicated something of such facts in connection with the events of Alexander's campaign in Asia Minor in 334. 83 Although, apart from Ephesus, there is no information about the establishment of Persian garrisons in the Greek cities of Asia Minor at this time, it seems quite probable that at least some other communities were then garrisoned (for example, a number of cities of Aeolis and Ionia that were liberated by Alcimachus on Alexander's order in 334 [Arr. an. 1.18.1]; see Bosworth 1980, 134) . It is uncertain when the Persians placed their garrison in Miletus (not falling under control of the expeditionary corps in 336-335) the soldiers of which resisted Alexander in . It is possible that it had already stood in the city (so to speak, on an ongoing basis) before Philip launched his campaign in Asia Minor; but it can be equally admitted that its introduction in the city occurred at the same time when the Persians put their garrisons in the Anatolian Greek cities recaptured from the Macedonians, i. e. in 335. Similarly: Gehrke 1985, 116. 84 It cannot be ruled out that one of these exiles was the Ephesian Delius (Plato's pupil) who, in Plutarch's words, "having been sent by the Greeks living in Asia came to Alexander and encouraged him more than anyone to go to war against the barbarian Persians (Plut. Adv. Col. 32.1126d; cf. Philostr. soph. 485-486, who names in a similar case not Delius but Dias and speaks about his mission to Philip; for the evaluation of these accounts of Plutarch and Philostratus, with justly critical attitude towards the latter, see Trampedach 1994, 100-101) . True, it is absolutely incredible that Delius was officially delegated to Alexander by the Greek population of Asia Minor as a whole, as follows from Plutarch's account. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that in this case he acted either on his own initiative or on behalf of his pro-Macedonian fellow-citizens, presenting himself as a person who expresses the sentiments common to all Anatolian Greeks. However, cf. Gehrke 1985, 59, n. 22; Brunt 1993, 291 . If Delius indeed came to Alexander, being already in addition, profaned the burial of Heropythus at the city's agora (Arr. an. 1.17.9-12). Besides, the analogous changes in government may have happened also in the island communities of the eastern Aegean that had come over to the Macedonian side earlier. Indeed, although the Persian fleet did not appear in the Aegean in 335, it is hard to imagine that Memnon or the satraps of western Asia Minor, waging the military actions on its coast, were unable, if they wished, to use the local Greek cities' ships, especially given that a few of them were needed to transport the troops to the nearby islands.85 On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the circumstance (as has been indicated above in connection with my reflections on what happened in the islands in 336) that the internal political changes in these communities could have taken place also under the indirect influence of events occurring in Asia Minor.86 At the same time, it has to be accepted that if such changes really occurred then, they did not become the norm: as the cases of Antissa and Eresus show (see above), pro-Macedonian regimes survived unbroken at least in a number of the island cities.
exile, then their meeting should have occurred in the winter of 335/334 or in the early spring of 334. At the same time, it can be also assumed that his visit took place earlier -either in late 336, when after Philip's death the Ephesian democrats, on behalf of whom Delius could speak in such a case, had to fear that the young king would postpone the war against Persia or refuse it at all (cf. Berve 1926, II 131, no. 251; Bosworth 1980, 131; Trampedach 1994, 101; Flower 2000, 107; Heckel 2006, 106) , or in the autumn of 335, when -because of the failures of the Macedonian advance-guard in Asia Minor -the democratic government of Ephesus was at risk of falling. At any rate, it should be believed that the visit of Delius to Alexander aimed to settle, with the king's help, above all the matters of Ephesus or more exactly the fate of its pro-Macedonian democratic regime (although it is worth accepting too that Delius simultaneously expressed the desire common to a significant part of the Greeks of Asia Minor -their quick liberation by Alexander, the Panhellenic League's hegemon, from the shameful domination of the barbarian Persians; on such sentiments, see above). 85 An illustration in this connection is the capture of two warships of Ephesus by the Greek mercenaries (being its Persian garrison) in 334, when they decided to leave the city before the Macedonian army's approach (Arr. an. 1.17.9). Besides, the Persians were able to also use the Carian flotilla for transporting their troops to the islands, since the Persian government already controlled Caria (and Lycia) by that time (see below). On the flotilla of Pixodarus (and Orontobates), see Ruzicka 1992, 127-128, 132, 136; 2010, 4-5. 86 It is surprising that scholars (see e. g. Rosen 1982, 355; Hammond 1988, 69, n. 2; 73, n. 2; 74, n. 2; Bosworth 1988, 192, n. 8 ) rightly criticizing Heisserer's statement that Memnon commanded the Persian fleet in the eastern Aegean already in 335 and thereby restored control over the "defected" islands of the area (Heisserer 1980, 59, 77, 83, 132) , do not take into account the fact that the Persians had then also other means to achieve such a result (at least in the case of some island communities). (Incidentally, Heisserer was not the first who wrongly believed that Memnon occupied the position of admiral of the Persian fleet in 335; so e. g.: Olmstead 1948, 491.) There remains to point out that by this time, or more exactly even earlier, the Persians had already controlled the situation in the peninsula's south-west, namely in Caria (and Lycia). We do not know when precisely the negotiations between Philip and Pixodarus about a marriage alliance were finished (whether they were terminated shortly after Philip had learned of Alexander's intervention in them, as it seems to follow from Plutarch's account, or whether they continued to be hold afterwards, perhaps even up to the death of the Macedonian king). Nevertheless, one thing is certain: these negotiations led to no constructive results. What happened in Caria later, one can imagine from the words of Strabo. He writes that Pixodarus, having taken the side of the Persians (περσίσας), asked Darius for a satrap in order to share the rule with him, and when such a person came (it was a Persian nobleman called Orontobates),87 Pixodarus gave his daughter Ada88 to him in marriage (Strab. 14.2.17.657). However, when commenting this passage of Strabo, Ruzicka believes it to be unlikely that "Pixodarus would surrender any power in Caria unless compelled to do so". In the scholars' view, in early 335 Darius decided, among other things, to establish his direct control over Caria, since under the then circumstances this satrapy became especially important, and sent Orontobates to take it (and Lycia) over and to ensure the reliable defense of south-western Asia Minor against potential Macedonian invasion. Likewise, as Ruzicka points out, Strabo's remark that Orontobates shared power with Pixodarus, possibly indicates that while the latter remained dynast of Caria, the former exercised satrapal functions in it. According to Ruzicka, this as well as the marriage of Orontobates to Pixodarus' daughter shows that in this case the situation unfolded peacefully.89 It is not ruled out that the reconstruction of events as suggested by Ruzicka is correct. Yet, in my opinion, one can also not discard (contrary to his hypothesis) the possibility that Strabo rightly pointed at Pixodarus as an initiator of the request addressed to the Persian king to send a co-ruler to him.90 Indeed, when, on the one hand, the Carian dynast's diplomatic contacts with Macedonia were broken and, on the other hand, it became clear that the new Great king firmly established himself on the throne and began to decisively restore order in the lands of the Persian Empire, including those in western Asia Minor, Pixodarus' intention to show his loyalty to Darius and thereby to avoid possible reprisals against him in the future, even at the cost of his former large power in Caria, looks quite logical. In all likelihood, one can agree that Pix-87 Arr. an. 1.23.8. On Orontobates, see Berve 1926, II 295-296, no. 594; Ruzicka 1992, 133; Heckel 2006, 186. 88 She was probably the same daughter he had offered to Arrhideus. 89 Ruzicka 1992, 132-133; similarly: Briant 2002 , 1042 . 90 Cf. Hornblower 1982 Sears 2014, 215. odarus acted under Darius' pressure. But it seems that this compulsion should not be overestimated too much: at any rate, Pixodarus, who was probably at an advanced age, needed to solve the issue of his heir as soon as possible (because Pixodarus had neither a sister-wife, like Mausolus and Hidrieus, nor, insofar as we are able to judge, a son), and under the circumstances there remained nothing better for him to do than to turn to Darius; in addition, it appears that such a variant -in view of Pixodarus' pro-Persian orientation clearly shown by him earlier and departed only once (in connection with the negotiations with Philip about a marriage agreement during the recent crisis in the Achaemenid Empire) -was hardly perceived by him as too burdensome. However, whatever one thinks about who preciseliy was the initiator behind Orontobates' sending to Caria, either Pixodarus himself or Darius, it is obvious that after this person's arrival there (perhaps in early 335) Caria (and Lycia) found itself firmly tied to the imperial chariot of the Achaemenids and then, after Pixodarus' death (most likely not later than the middle of the same year),91 came already under direct Persian control -with Orontobates as the legitimate successor of the dynast of Caria (by means of the marriage to his daughter) and its satrap (Strab. 14.2.17.657; Arr. an.
1.23.8).92
In conclusion, one can see that despite the big military successes of the expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336, the campaign of the next year 335 ended for the Macedonians badly: apart from Abydus (and perhaps Rhoeteum), the rest of the gains were lost by them, control over the seized coast of western Asia Minor and perhaps some communities in the nearby islands. Furthermore, the hopes for a military alliance with Pixodarus, which could be very advantageous for the Macedonian monarchy, were dashed.
It seems certain that these initial successes and subsequent failures of the Macedonian advance-guard in Asia Minor were dependent above all on the state of the central governments both in the Achaemenid Empire and Macedonia in this period. Indeed, while the Persian kingdom suffered from the dynastic crisis, its central government and local authorities in western Anatolia were unable to effectively resist the Macedonian aggression. But when the situation in Persia was 91 Ruzicka 1992, 133-134; Heckel 2006, 4, no. 2, 223; cf. Berve 1926, II 321, no. 640; Hornblower 1982, 46-50. 92 That after Pixodarus' death Orontobates represented himself as his legitimate successor, both as dynast and as satrap, is confirmed by the continuation of the traditional Hecatomnid coinage under him, now with his name instead of that of Pixodarus. For Orontobates' tetradrachms bearing the inscription ΡΟΟΝΤΟΠΑΤΟ, see Head 1911, 630. Whether or not Orontobates officially shared the rule with his wife, as Mausolus and Hidrieus had done earlier, is unclear; though it is quite possible. Cf. Hornblower 1982, 49-50; Ruzicka 1992, 135, 205, n. 1; Heckel 2006, 4, no. 2. stabilized after Darius had firmly established himself on the throne, and in Macedonia the situation, on the contrary, became complicated after the murder of Philip and the accession of Alexander who was then forced to deal with a number of challenges and threats in his kingdom, Greece and the Balkans, and thus had no possibility to pay proper attention to the affairs in Asia Minor, the Persians finally managed to take measures to launch a successful counter-offensive there. Besides, it is worth thinking that there was one more reason for the expeditionary corps' failures: it appears that although the Macedonians had substantial numerical superiority, Memnon, heading his Greek mercenaries, showed a higher level of generalship than Parmenio in the struggle for Asia Minor in 335. One gets the impression that the Rhodian seized the initiative from the enemy due to the victory of Magnesia and his subsequent bold and rapid maneuvers threatening the line of Macedonian communications and as a result imposed his rules of the game on Parmenio, who was operating conservatively. And after Memnon had turned the tide in western Asia Minor in favour of the Persians, it seems to have not been too hard for Arsites and Spithridates (who must have made significant progress in recruiting troops in their satrapies by that moment) to build on the already existing achievements: presumably the troops of these satraps or of one of them defeated Calas' detachment in the Troad and, in all probability, gained also some other victories. In addition, now it was all the easier for the Persian commanders to restore their power over the territories of western Asia Minor, because, insofar as we are able to judge, the inhabitants of the local Greek communities, when they had lost both external support after the Macedonian troops' retreat and possibly hopes for their return (at least in the near future), found that it is better for them to surrender their cities to the Persians without resistance.
At the same time it would be wrong to hold that the military operations conducted by the Macedonians in Asia Minor in 336-335 brought them nothing. True, they retained the bridgehead on the Asian coast of the Hellespont -Abydus (and maybe Rhoeteum). It is unknown why the Persian commanders left it in Macedonian hands and thus did not finish the "reconquista" of Asia Minor. But it is not ruled out that they did this on purpose: on the one hand, any operation to capture this bridgehead in which most likely the whole strength of the expeditionary corps was concentrated and which the Macedonians may have tried to duly fortify, would have cost heavy casualties and considerable time for the Persians and would also not have necessarily ended with success; on the other hand, it is quite possible that the relative ease with which the Persians succeeded in the fight against the Macedonian advance-guard led Darius and his commanders to believe in their military superiority over the enemy and, consequently, to assume that when Alexander with his army would appear in Anatolia, it would be much more profitable to defeat him immediately in a big battle and thereby to end the existing war once and for all. (Incidentally, it is worth supposing that it was such a position of the Persians that was the reason why their fleet did not appear in the Aegean in 335: they were possibly not only unable to thereby prevent the crossing of Alexander's army, while the Macedonians held the bridgehead on the Asian coast of the Hellespont, but did not intend to do that at all.) However, whatever may have caused the Persians' refusal to struggle for the bridgehead at the time, it is quite clear that its retention by the Macedonians was highly important for the further military actions: this allowed Alexander to land his army in Asia Minor in the spring of 334 without hindrance and, relying on that base, to begin the organized offensive. It seems that another important result of the campaign of 336-335, significantly influencing Alexander's subsequent achievements in his conquest of the Anatolian coast and the nearby islands, was the circumstance that, insofar as we are able to judge, at least one, if not all, of the principles of Alexander's policy towards the Greek cities of Asia Minor, demonstrated by him in 334, originated just from this period: the encouragement of democracies in these cities. Indeed, in my view, there is every reason to believe that such a principle began to be implemented (although it did not become the norm yet) and proved its usefulness right during the military operations waged by the Macedonian advance-guard in Asia Minor -already in Philip's lifetime. Due to this, as well as the Panhellenic slogans adopted by Philip in the war against Persia, he already then managed to bring in the Greek cities of Asia Minor not only democrats being in opposition to local pro-Persian oligarchic or tyrannical regimes on his side, but in most cases also the majority of their population. As a consequence, Philip and then Alexander had at their disposal, apart from the threat to use force (this universal instrument of subjugation), an additional effective tool both for capturing the Greek cities of Asia Minor and retaining them after friendly democrats' coming to power there. Nevertheless, no matter how considerable the support for the Macedonian monarchy was in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, it appears that the outcome of the military operations in 335 clearly showed to Alexander the following: these cities were ready to stay on the Macedonian side, but only as long as they were not seriously threatened by the Persians. At the same time, it is worth suggesting that the decision of the Greek communities of Asia Minor not to resist the Persian troops in late 335 and their, as a rule, analogous position towards Alexander's army in 334 could not but be influenced by the tragedy of Gryneium. It seems that such an event had to strengthen their inhabitants' opinion that if there was a possibility, it would be better not to resist any superior armed force, whether Persian or Macedonian. Finally, the campaign of 336-335 in Asia Minor appears to have given the Macedonians one more useful result: experience in fighting the Persians, which the Macedonian army had not had up to this point;93 and we can be almost sure that such an experience was used by Alexander subsequently.
Thus, in my opinion, despite the expeditionary corps' very serious failures in 335, it is hardly possible to say that the military operations it waged ended in its total defeat. Indeed, although the final achievements of the Macedonian advance-guard were highly modest, they, however, were of a certain value. In turn, there is no doubt that those operations had major significance for Alexander's campaign in Asia Minor in 334: a number of preconditions for its full success had been created right in their course.
